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ABSTRACT
The Framing Effect and Breast Cancer Treatment Options:
Do Individual Characteristics Play a Role?
Kelly L. Schuller
The effect of frame, or the way in which options are worded, has been shown to influence
decisions in many domains; however, the literature lacks studies that examine the effect of age
and other individual characteristics on susceptibility to the framing effect. Sixty-eight collegeaged women (M age = 19.10 years, SD = 1.54) and sixty-six women over the age of 60 years (M
age = 70.76 years, SD = 7.10) were presented with breast cancer vignettes that varied by frame
(i.e., gains option worded in terms of number of women who would be cured and loss option
worded in terms of number of women who would die) and degree of risk involved (i.e., risk
averse versus risk seeking). Tversky and Kaheman’s classic Asian disease design was adapted to
create the breast cancer vignette. Participants rated the likelihood of choosing the risk-averse or
the risk-seeking treatments. The influence of individual characteristics (age, experience with
breast cancer, cognitive ability, cognitive processing, sensation seeking, and need for cognition)
on treatment decisions was examined. When presented with the negative frame, older women
made riskier decisions than did women presented with the positive frame. Frame, however, did
not influence younger women’s decisions. Experience with breast cancer (personal and
vicarious), crystallized and fluid intelligence (as assessed by the Kaufman Brief Intelligence
Test), analytical versus heuristic cognitive processing (as assessed by the Rational Experiential
Inventory), and sensation seeking (as assessed by the Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale) were
not associated with treatment decisions. Women lower in need for cognition made riskier
decisions than did women higher in need for cognition, but that did not vary by frame. The age x
frame interaction found using with the breast cancer vignette was also shown using general
cancer and non-cancer vignettes. This indicates the interaction of age and frame is generalizable
to domains other than breast cancer. Thus, the way in which options are worded influences older
women’s decisions, which may influence outcomes, particularly in the domain of health. Results
can be used to inform health professionals on the best way to present treatment information to
patients.
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The Framing Effect and Breast Cancer Treatment Options:
Do Individual Characteristics Play a Role?
Research that examines medical decision making indicates that the way in which a
treatment option is framed (worded either positively or negatively) influences peoples’ choice of
treatment (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). The degree to which frame impacts treatment decision may be influenced by
individual difference characteristics. One individual characteristic that may be important is age.
Age has been shown to influence the ways in which individuals process information and reason
(Klacyznski & Robinson, 2000); however, few studies examine the impact of age and frame on
medical decision making. Other individual characteristics, such as experience, cognitive ability,
sensation seeking, need for cognition, and type of cognitive processing may also influence
medical decision making. The literature lacks empirical studies that examine how the way
treatment options are framed in combination with individual characteristics influence the
decisions that women make when dealing with breast cancer. The current study adds to the
literature by examining these variables as they relate to women’s decisions when presented with
a vignette dealing with breast cancer.
Women’s Health
The issue of women’s health has gained the attention of both policy makers and
researchers. According to the US Census (2003), fifty-one percent of the total US population is
female; however, the proportions of the sexes vary by age. There are more males than females in
the younger age groups and consecutively more females than males with age. Breast cancer is an
important health concern that impacts both females and males; however, breast cancer is about
100 times more likely to affect females (American Cancer Society, ACS, 2006). Many women
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will be influenced by breast cancer either personally or through someone they know. According
to the American Cancer Society, breast cancer is the most common form of cancer in women,
following skin cancer. Over 2 million women in the United States have breast cancer. Among
women’s cancer-caused deaths, breast cancer ranks second only to lung cancer. Approximately
40,410 women will die from the disease in the year 2006. Breast cancer strikes women of all
ages and races; however, the chances of getting breast cancer increase with age. At age 30
women have a one in 2525 risk of getting breast cancer, by age 40 this increases to one in 217
and one out of 24 by 60 years of age. The chance of a woman having breast cancer at some time
during her lifetime is 1 in 7; the chance of a women dying from breast cancer is 1 in 33 (ACS).
Breast Cancer Decision-Making
The literature that examines medical decision-making is expansive. Research has
examined decision making related to many different types of cancer, including prostate cancer
(Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006), lung cancer (Sharf, Stelljes, & Gordon, 2005), cervical cancer
(White, Wearing, & Hill, 1994), skin cancer (Rasmussen, 2005), and breast cancer (Meyer,
Russo, & Talbot, 1995). Women diagnosed with breast cancer face a variety of decisions,
including which treatment options are best for them. There are many treatment options available
(www.breastcancer.org, 2006). Decisions must be made whether to choose conservative or
radical treatment options. Conservative treatment options include lumpectomy, whereas, radical
treatment options include single or double mastectomy. In addition, chemotherapy, radiation
therapy, or hormonal therapies are often part of the treatment regimen. Information about
treatment options is often presented to patients by a physician or someone on the medical staff.
In addition, women may be given literature on the treatment options available and what is
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involved with each option. Many factors, such as how the information is presented, may
influence the decision-making process.
Theories of Decision Making
Decision making can be rational or irrational. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
Expected Utility Theory (1947) describes several axioms, or principles, for rational decision
making. One principle, invariance, states “the preference order between prospects should not
depend on the manner in which they are described” (Kahneman & Tversky 1984). Therefore,
according to Expected Utility Theory, when making decisions, a rational individual’s choice
should not be influenced by the way in which the options are worded or framed. However,
research indicates that the way in which a message is framed or worded in terms of either gains
or losses influences peoples’ decisions (McNeil et al., 1982; Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1979). Tversky and Kahneman’s Prospect Theory describes conditions which
induce individuals to make irrational choices. According to Prospect Theory, people
“overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely
probable” (Tversky & Kahneman, p. 265). People tend to be risk averse (i.e., choose the sure
thing) when the problem is framed, or worded, positively in terms of gains, whereas people are
risk seeking (i.e., choose the risky option) when the problem is framed, or worded, negatively in
terms of losses.
The Framing Effect
In the classic framing effect study, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) presented participants
with the hypothetical vignette below which described an ambiguous Asian disease.
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed.
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) study, participants were asked to choose between
treatment options. Treatment options contained the same expected outcome in terms of risk;
however, options were presented as either gain-framed or loss-framed. In the gain-framed
condition, the treatment options were described as the number of lives that would be saved; in
the loss-framed condition, treatment options were described as the number of lives that would be
lost. The participants were asked to assume that the exact scientific estimates of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
Gain-framed condition:
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Loss-framed condition:
If program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
Tversky and Kahneman (1979) found that a framing effect occurred. That is, although the
outcomes of the positive gain-framed and negative loss-framed options are statistically
equivalent, the way in which the options were worded affected the treatment decision. In the
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gain-framed condition, participants chose the less risky option or the “sure thing” (program A).
In the loss-framed condition, participants chose the more risky option (program B).
The framing effect is a well established phenomenon that has been examined using
different designs in multiple domains: the Asian disease design (the classic study design
presented above), the gambling design, the tax evasion design, the clinical reasoning design, the
bargaining design, the message compliance design, the escalation of commitment design, the
evaluation of objects design, and the game-theory design (see Kuhberger, 1998 for review).
Kuhberger conducted a meta-analysis of 136 empirical studies that used various designs to
examine the framing effect. Results of the meta-analysis showed that, in general, the effect of
frame was small to moderate; however, the calculation of effect sizes was difficult because many
of the studies did not report effect sizes. Kuhberger also stated that there was a larger effect of
frame when using the Asian disease design as compared to any of the other designs. In the
current study, the classic Asian disease design was adapted for use with medical decisions about
breast cancer. Thus, it was expected that there would be an effect of frame on treatment decision.
Research shows that the way information is framed influences decisions in many
different areas, including business decision making (Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 2004), gambling
decisions (Loke & Tan, 1992), marketing research (Block & Keller, 1995; Olekalns & Frey,
1994), and medical decision making (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). The influence of frame on
medical decision making has consistently been shown in the literature and persists even when a
single person is presented with both frames (Frisch, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). In a study
that examined the effect of frame on 133 women’s (ages 40 and older) decisions to undergo a
preventative mammography, Banks and colleagues (1995) found that women were more likely to
choose to undergo a mammography when presented with a video message that was negatively
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framed (i.e., stressing the risks of not getting a mammography) as compared to women who were
presented with a video message framed positively (i.e., stressing the benefits of getting a
mammography). Similarly, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) found that young adult women
presented with a pamphlet that emphasized the risks of not performing self-breast exams (i.e.,
loss-framed information) reported that they would more likely to perform a self-breast
examination as opposed to women presented with: (1) a pamphlet that emphasized the benefits of
performing self-breast exams (i.e., gain-framed information), (2) a pamphlet that did not present
either the benefits or risks, or (3) no pamphlet at all. Malloy, Wigton, Meeske, and Tape (1992)
examined the influence of frame on older adults’ decisions about medical intervention (i.e., lifesustaining treatment). Results showed that individuals presented with a negative description of
the treatment (i.e., “machine that controls your breathing”, p. 145) were less likely to choose the
intervention as compared individuals presented with a neutral frame (i.e., “breathing by
machine”, p. 145), or positive frame (i.e., “device to help you breathe”, p.145). Together, these
results indicate that the way in which a medical decision is framed, particularly when framed
negatively, or in terms of losses, influences choices to undergo preventative therapy and
treatment.
In the current study, the Asian disease design of Tversky and Kahneman (1979) was used
to examine the framing effect in women’s medical decision making when dealing with breast
cancer. Positive frame was presented as the number of women who would be cured and the
negative frame was presented as the number of women who would die. Consistent with Prospect
Theory, it was expected that women presented with the positive frame would be more likely to
be risk-averse (i.e., more likely to choose the “sure thing”), whereas women presented with the
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negative frame would be more likely to be “risk-taking” (i.e., more likely to choose the risky
option).
Processing: Analytical versus Heuristic
An important aspect to consider when examining the influence of frame on decision
making is the different types of cognitive processing in which individuals engage. Various terms
have been applied to these types of processing: experiential and rational (Epstein, Lipson,
Holstein, & Hub, 1992), systematic and heuristic (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), intuition and
reasoning (Kahneman, 2003), and analytical and heuristic (Finucane, et al., 2002; Klaczynski &
Robinson, 2000; Park, 1999; see Table 1). The terms analytical and heuristic processing are used
in this report because the terms are most common in the literature.
Analytical processing involves “in-depth” mental processing, that is, “analytical
processing is consciously controlled, effortful, and relies on abilities that are frequently believed
to reflect cognitive maturity” (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000, p. 400; see Table 1). Analytical
processing is more likely to occur when the person is highly motivated or when the decision, or
the consequence of the decision, is very important (Klaczynski & Robinson).
In contrast, heuristic processing involves the use of mental shortcuts to make decisions
quickly and often efficiently. Heuristic processing involves less “in-depth” mental processing
than does analytical processing, that is, heuristic system processing is preconscious, rapid, and
effortless (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000, p. 400; see Table 1). Heuristic processing is more
likely to occur when the decision is not very important or when the person is not able or
motivated to invest cognitive energy to the decision-making process (Finucane, et. al., 2002), or
when the person is an expert in the area of the decision (Johnson, 1981). The role of expertise in
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understanding the decision-making process is developed in greater detail in the cognitive
processing and experience/expertise section.
Dual or Single Framework of Cognitive Processing
In the literature described above, cognitive processing is viewed as two distinct systems
(i.e., analytical versus heuristic). This is known as the dual processes, or “dualist” approach
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Hub, 1992; Finucane, et al., 2002;
Kahneman, 2003). The dual process approach describes processing as two independent but
interactive systems. One system, heuristic processing, is based on intuition and is implicit (i.e.,
without awareness), whereas, the other system, analytical processing, is based on logical
reasoning and is explicit (i.e., deliberate and with awareness). Another approach views cognitive
processing as a single framework (Hammond, 1996; Oberauer, 2000; Osman, 2004). According
to the single framework approach, cognitive processing moves along a continuum, with heuristic
reasoning at one end and analytical reasoning at the other. Although recent literature emphasizes
the dual process approach, Hammond argues that a single framework approach is advantageous
because it “accommodates a broader range of processing within a single-system framework”
(Osman, p. 993). The current study examines cognitive processing as both a single framework
(i.e., overall cognitive processing denoted “cognitive processing”) and as dual processes (i.e.,
analytical processing, denoted “need for cognition”, and heuristic processing, denoted “faith in
intuition”).
Cognitive Processing as an Individual Characteristic or Situational Variable
In addition to viewing cognitive processing as a continuum or dual processes, cognitive
processing can be viewed as either an individual characteristic that is stable across time or a
variable that depends on the situation. For example, an individual’s tendency, or need, to engage
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in effortful thinking (i.e., analytical processing) is referred to as an individual’s need for
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). In general, this is often described as a personality trait that
is fairly stable across time. In contrast, literature from social psychologists who conduct research
on persuasion view cognitive processing, or the use of analytical versus heuristic reasoning as
dependent upon the situation (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, if an
individual is motivated, he or she may engage in analytical processing. However, if the
individual is not motivated, he or she may engage in heuristic processing.
Cognitive Processing and Frame
The influence of the way in which a message is worded, or framed, and the type of
processing in which an individual engages could work together to impact decision making in
various ways. According to Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990), the effects of framing on
message persuasiveness can be explained by Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) Heuristic-Systematic
Model (HSM). According to HSM, negatively framed information is “non-normative”, and
therefore not as expected as positively framed information. Thus, when an individual engages in
analytical processing, negatively framed messages should be more persuasive than positively
framed messages. Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy argue that individuals more readily accept
positively worded versus negatively worded information, therefore, when an individual engages
in heuristic processing, positively framed messages should be more persuasive than negatively
framed messages. According to Kahneman (2003), when individuals engage in analytical
processing and are presented with both frames, they are more likely to recognize the
relationships between framed options and answer consistently for both positively and negatively
framed options. Thus, when individuals engage in analytical processing, the frame of the
message should not impact the decision. In contrast, the frame, or way in which treatment
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options are presented, could influence decisions when an individual relies on heuristic
processing. Thus, in the current study, individuals who rely on heuristic processing (i.e., those
with high faith in intuition) may be influenced by the framing of the treatment options whereas
individuals who rely on analytical processing (i.e., those with high need for cognition) may not
be influenced by frame.
Mediator and Moderator Models
Individual characteristics, such as those described below, may function as mediator or
moderator variables. A mediator variable is a variable that accounts for, or explains the
mechanism by which a relationship between a predictor and a criterion variable occurs
(Holmbeck, 1997). In order for a variable to function as a mediator it must meet the following
criteria: “a) variations in levels of the independent variable significantly account for variations in
the presumed mediator (see Path a in Figure 1), b) variations in the mediator significantly
account for variations in the dependent variable (see Path b in Figure 1), and c) when Paths a and
b (see Figure 1) are controlled, a previously significant relationship between the independent and
dependent variables is no longer significant, or decreases (as indicated by the standardized B
weights; see Path c in Figure 1)” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176).
A moderator is a variable that influences that strength or direction of the relationship
between a predictor variable and a criterion variable (Baron& Kenny). In order for a variable to
function as a moderator it must meet the following criteria: a) the predictor must be significantly
related to the criterion variable (see Path a in Figure 2), b) the moderator must be significantly
related to the criterion variable (see Path b in Figure 2), and c) the predictor x moderator
interaction must be significantly related to the criterion variable (see Path c in Figure 2).
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Everyday Problem Solving and Decision Making
The everyday problem-solving literature that addresses how individual difference
characteristics influence the problem-solving process may provide insight on the factors that
influence decision making. There is a large amount of research that examines everyday problem
solving (see Thorton & Dumke, 2005 for review). Problem solving can be viewed as part of the
decision-making process. Problem solving involves the presentation of a problem and the
generation of various strategies to solve that problem. Decision making can be viewed as the
final product of problem solving in that it involves evaluating the possible strategies or options
and selecting one to use (Finucane, et al., 2002). In a meta-analysis of age differences in
everyday problem solving and decision making, Thorton and Dumke (2005) found that outcomes
in the everyday problem-solving literature were not significantly different from those in the
decision-making literature. Thus, one can draw information from the everyday problem-solving
literature when examining the decision-making process.
Individual Characteristics
Age
Age differences in processing. Age has been shown to influence everyday problem
solving and decision making. A recent meta-analysis that examined age differences in everyday
problem solving and decision making from laboratory studies showed that older adults had
poorer everyday problem-solving/decision-making effectiveness than did young adults and
middle-aged adults (Thorton & Dumke, 2005). In addition, laboratory studies indicate older
adults tend to seek out and use less information when solving problems and making decisions
than do younger adults (Berg, Johnson, Meegan, & Strough, 2003; Berg, Meegan, & Klaczynski,
1999; Johnson, 1990; Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995). In an everyday decision-making task,
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Johnson (1993) found that older adults sought out less information and spent more time
reviewing that information than did younger adults. Berg, Johnson, Meegan, and Strough used
the same everyday decision-making task as did Johnson to examine collaborative everyday
problem solving and also found that older adults took more time to make a decision than did
younger adults. Cheng and Strough (2004) examined individual and collaborative problem
solving and also showed that older adults took more time to complete the task than did younger
adults.
Time to make decisions with the decision-making task used by Johnson (1993) and Berg
and colleagues (2003) was measured in seconds. The difference in the time taken by older and
younger adults in the problem-solving task by Cheng and Strough (2004) was approximately 11
minutes (see p.181). It is difficult to state that mere seconds or minutes actually influence
decision making in a real-world decision-making situation, such as dealing with breast cancer.
However, Meyer and colleagues (1995) examined age differences in decisions about breast
cancer treatment with women who were actually diagnosed with breast cancer and found that
older women sought out less information and took less time (measured in days) to make the
decision than did younger adults. Laboratory studies suggest older adults take more time to
make decisions than do younger adults (in terms of seconds or minutes). Real-world studies
suggest older adults take less time to make decisions than do younger adults (in terms of days).
With age, individuals may be more likely to use heuristic processing as opposed to
analytical processing, which could influence the way in which framing of information affects
decisions. In this respect age differences may be a marker variable for the type of cognitive
processing used. Thus, age differences in decisions may be mediated by type of cognitive
processing (i.e., analytical or heuristic).

The Framing of

13

Research also suggests that older adults process positive and negative information
differently than do younger adults. Recent work by Carstensen and her colleagues (Lockenhoff
& Carstensen, 2004) suggests that older adults process positive information to a greater extent
than do younger adults. When asked to choose between different health plans older adults spent
more time reviewing the positive features of the plans; younger adults spent more time reviewing
the negative features of the plans (Lockenhoff & Carstensen). According to Maheswaran and
Meyers-Levy’s (1990) application of the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993)
to message framing, this could indicate that younger adults use a more analytical processing
approach and focus on the negatives, whereas, older adults use a more heuristic processing
approach and focus on the positives. Kahneman (2003) suggests that individuals who engage in
heuristic processing are more influenced by the way in which a message is framed, or worded;
therefore, perhaps older women will be more influenced by the frame than will younger women.
One explanation for differences in the type of cognitive processing used with age is that
heuristic processing uses less cognitive energy than analytical processing, which may
compensate for age-related declines in cognitive capacity. According to the model of Selective
Optimization with Compensation (Baltes & Baltes, 1990), throughout the life span there are
gains and losses in both cognitive and physical ability; however, with age, there tends to be more
losses than gains. It is argued that declines in fluid intelligence, particularly working memory
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) lead to poorer decision making (i.e., seeking out less information,
or taking longer) in older adults as compared to younger adults. Another explanation may be
that individuals with a large amount of experience or expertise in an area may be more likely to
engage in heuristic processing (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). However, the literature is inconsistent
as to whether age differences in the decision-making process influence the quality of decisions.
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Real-world studies, such as that of Meyer, Russo and Talbot (1995), suggest the quality of older
adults’ decisions is about the same as that of younger adults (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995).
Thorton and Dumke’s (2004) meta-analysis of laboratory studies suggests age-related declines in
the quality of decisions. Therefore, it is not clear whether differences in processing of
information with age necessarily translate to differences in the quality of outcomes, particularly
when dealing with real-world situations.
Age and frame. Little research has examined how age and message frame influence
medical decision making. Kuberger (1998) reviewed the research that examined the effect of
frame to date and concluded that age may be an individual characteristic that would influence the
effect of frame. Kuberger conducted the meta-analysis in 1998, since that time very little
research has examined the influence of age on the framing effect. Mayhorn, Fisk, and Whittle
(2002) examined the influence of age on medical and financial decisions and suggested that there
are minimal age differences. McKee (2001) examined medical decision making and found that
younger adults may be slightly more influenced by the frame than are older adults. However,
this trend was not significant, and is inconsistent with what is suggested by research that
examines age differences in cognitive processing. Inconsistencies in the literature on the effect
of age and frame on decisions support the need for studies that examine the interactions between
age and the manner in which information is framed. As suggested by the cognitive processing
literature, perhaps older adults will be more likely to use heuristic processing than will younger
adults. Thus, older adults may be more influenced by the framing of the treatment options than
will younger adults.
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Age and cognitive ability. Another individual characteristic that is potentially important
to examine is an individual’s cognitive ability. Potential age variations in cognitive processing
(i.e., analytical versus heuristic) have been explained by differences in cognitive capacity (Yates
& Patalano, 1999). That is, it is argued that older adults may use heuristic processing to a greater
extent than do younger adults in order to compensate for age-related cognitive decline (Finucane
et. al. 2002). It is assumed that older adults suffer from declines in fluid intelligence; therefore,
decreasing their cognitive capacity, which may lead to a greater reliance on heuristics rather than
analytical processing. Thus older adults may be more likely to be influenced by the frame of the
treatment options. A measure of cognitive abilities that assesses fluid and crystallized
intelligence separately is needed in order to test this claim. In addition, working memory has
often been linked to cognitive ability (Engle, 2002); however, recent literature emphasizes the
notion that working memory and intelligence are different constructs (Ackerman, Beier, &
Boyle, 2000). Therefore, a separate measure of working memory may also help to understand
potential age differences in the susceptibility of frame.
Experience
Research suggests that experience influences decision making. Meyer, Russo, and Talbot
(1995) found that previous knowledge about breast cancer and treatment for breast cancer
affected whether women chose lumpectomy, mastectomy, or radiation therapy. Also, women
mentioned experience with breast cancer when asked to provide a rationale for whether they
made an immediate or delayed treatment decision. Zwahr (1994) examined the effect of
previous knowledge on women’s decisions about estrogen replacement therapy and found that
previous knowledge influenced the number of treatments they felt would alleviate symptoms,
and the number of times they compared various treatment options. In an examination of older
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adults’ endorsement of interpersonal and individual health problem solving strategies, Snyder
(2004) found that experience impacted the ratings of problem solving strategies when dealing
with both heart and arthritis problems. Pierce (1993) suggests that when making medical
decisions individuals remember their own and others experiences with the problems. Therefore,
although few young adult women personally experience breast cancer, experience through
another person (vicarious experience) may also impact decisions. Patrick and Strough (2004)
found that personal and vicarious experience combined was related to the number of strategies
generated for solving everyday problems dealing with relocation; adults with experience
generated more strategies than those without experience. Together, this research suggests that
both personal and vicarious experience (i.e., experience through another person) with breast
cancer may impact the decision for treatment options.
Cognitive Processing and Experience/Expertise
Experience may also influence the type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus
heuristic) a persons uses to make decisions. Increased experience may lead to a greater reliance
on heuristic processing. According to Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), which has
been used to explain the framing effect, decision making involves both verbatim and gist mental
representations; however people tend to rely on gist representations. In addition, “intuitive gistbased processing supplants analytical verbatim-based processing as people gain experience or
novices become experts” (p. 66; Reyna, 2004). There is a large literature that examines decision
making by experts in various domains, including gambling (Loke & Tan, 1992), law (Johnson,
Johnson & Little, 1984), physics, (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), and medical decision making
(Johnson, 1981). In a study that examined expert cardiologists and less expert physicians’
decisions to admit a patient suffering from chest pains, results indicated that expert cardiologists
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relied more on heuristic processing than on analytical processing. Expert cardiologists used less
information to make a decision than did the less expert physicians; expert cardiologists
considered only whether a heart attack was imminent or not. If individuals with experience rely
on heuristic processing, the frame of the option may influence choice. However, it can also be
argued that experience with breast cancer may increase motivation, which is generally associated
with analytical processing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). If individuals with experience are more
motivated than those without experience to engage in analytical processing, the frame of the
option may not influence choice. Experience may influence motivation or the type of cognitive
processing used which, in turn, could influence the susceptibility of framing effects. Therefore,
experience may moderate the relationship between frame and decision.
Sensation Seeking
An individual’s general risk-taking propensity may also impact decisions that involve
risk. Sensation seeking can be defined as a personality trait that involves a person’s desire for
novel and intense sensory stimulation (Arnett, 1998; Zuckerman, 1994). Sensation seeking has
been linked to various risky behaviors, including erratic driving, promiscuous sexual behavior,
and drug abuse (see Zuckerman, 1994 for review). Arnett (1998) examined risky behavior in
adults aged 20-28 years and found sensation seeking to be positively associated with risky
driving, substance abuse, and risky sexual behavior. In addition, Rolison and Scherman (2002,
2003) found that sensation seeking was positively related to both adolescents’ and young adults’
risky behaviors respectively. Examination of age differences in risky behaviors is scarce and
inconsistent (Yates & Patalano, 1999). Although sensation seeking has consistently been shown
to be related to various risky behaviors, the influence of sensation seeking on medical decisions
has not been examined. It can be argued that an individual who is more likely to take risks in
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general may be more likely to choose the risk-seeking option regardless of the way in which it is
framed. Conversely, an individual who is less likely to take risks may be more likely to choose
the risk-averse option regardless of the way in which it is framed. Thus, the wording, or frame,
of treatment options may not influence treatment decisions for women who score extremely high
(risk takers) or extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation seeking. Thus, sensation seeking may
moderate the relation between frame and decision.
Analytical Processing and Need for Cognition
Given the information presented above on cognitive processing, the type of cognitive
processing (analytical or heuristic) may impact the influence of frame. Therefore, another
variable that needs to be examined is individual use of analytical versus heuristic processing. As
suggested by Kahneman (2003), an individual who generally uses analytical processing may not
be influenced by the frame whereas, an individual who generally relies upon heuristics when
making decisions may be influenced by the frame. Thus cognitive processing type (analytical
versus heuristic) may mediate the relationship between frame and decisions.
An individual’s tendency, or need, to engage in effortful thinking (i.e., analytical
processing) is referred to as an individual’s need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Need
for cognition has been shown to be negatively associated with susceptibility of framing effects
(Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004; Smith & Levin,
1998). Smith and Levin examined an individual’s need for cognition and message frame on
monetary tasks and medical decision making using a format consistent with the Asian disease
design. Results of the study indicated that for both types of tasks, framing effects emerged only
for participants low in need for cognition, or low in analytical processing. Similarly, Simon and
colleagues found that the framing effect was more pronounced in individuals with a low need for
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cognition. Perhaps frame will influence treatment decision in women with a low need for
cognition to a greater extent than it will for women high in need for cognition. Therefore, need
for cognition may moderate the relationship between frame and decisions.
Statement of the Problem
The issue of women’s health has increasingly gained the attention of physicians,
researchers, and policy makers. Females comprise the majority of the U.S. population, and there
are many more females than males in older adulthood (US Census, 2003). Breast cancer is a
common form of cancer in women (ACS, 2005). Individual characteristics, such as age, and
other variables in combination with how information is framed, may influence the decisions that
women make when presented with treatment options about breast cancer. Understanding the
decision-making process is very important for both medical service providers and women who
may be faced with decisions about treatments for breast cancer. Research on medical decision
making indicates that the way in which a treatment option is framed or worded in terms of either
gains or losses influences peoples’ decisions on treatment (McNeil et al., 1982; Rybash &
Roodin, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979), that is, a framing effect appears. Although the
framing effect in decision making has been reliably shown in many different areas, little research
examines how frame in combination with age, influence medical decisions. In order to gain a
better understanding of the process involved in medical decision making, new research must
examine the various factors may impact choice of treatment. For example, do individual
characteristics, such as cognitive ability, cognitive processing type (i.e., analytical versus
heuristic), need for cognition, sensation seeking and experience with the problem mediate or
moderate the effects of age and frame on medical decisions? The current study was designed to
contribute to the literature by examining the individual and interactive effects of individual
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characteristics on women’s susceptibility to the framing effect when presented with treatment
decision vignettes about breast cancer.
Design
The main subject variables was age (younger adult or older adult), and the main
independent variable was frame (treatment options presented either positively or negatively).
Additional subject variables were cognitive ability, analytical processing versus heuristic
processing, need for cognition, experience, and sensation seeking. Frame (positive and negative)
was counterbalanced and presented as a within-subjects variable in 3 domains. The domains
were breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer. The general cancer and non-cancer domains
were presented to examine the generalizability of the findings. In the primary analyses, frame
was analyzed as a between-subjects variable for the breast cancer domain only. The other
subject variables (individual difference variables) were between-subjects variables. The
dependent variable was treatment decision (i.e., the degree of likelihood of choosing a riskseeking versus risk-averse treatment option). The dependent variable was a continuous variable.
Research Questions
1) How do age and framing of the message (positive or negative) affect women’s choice of
treatment options for breast cancer?
2) Does type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic) mediate age
differences in treatment decision?
3) Do individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, need for cognition, experience,
and sensation seeking moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision?
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Hypotheses
Research Question 1
Frame
1) The influence of message frame on health decision making has consistently been shown
in the literature (Frisch, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). It was hypothesized that the
frame, or way in which treatment options were worded, would impact treatment decision
in the same way as that found in the classic framing study (Tversky &Kahneman, 1979).
When the treatment option was framed positively in terms of number of women cured,
people would choose a more risk-averse option. When the treatment option was framed
negatively in terms of number of women who would die, people would choose a more
risk-seeking option.
Age x Frame
2) Research suggests that older adults may be more likely than younger adults to engage in
heuristic processing (Park, 1999). Heuristic processing involves the use of mental
shortcuts, which may make individuals more susceptible to the framing effect. Therefore,
it was hypothesized that there would be a significant frame x age interaction; frame
would have more of an effect on older women than on younger women.
Research Question 2
Type of Cognitive Processing
3) Research indicates that the type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic)
may be associated with susceptibility to framing effects (Kahneman, 2003). It was
hypothesized that women who relied on heuristic processing would be influenced by the
way in which a message is framed whereas women who relied on analytical processing
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would not be influenced by frame. Thus, preferred cognitive processing type (i.e.,
analytical versus heuristic) was expected to mediate the relationship between frame and
decision.
Research Question 3
Cognitive Ability
4) Individuals with lower cognitive ability may be more likely to use heuristic processing;
therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with lower cognitive ability scores would
be influenced more by the frame than would individuals who scored higher on cognitive
ability. Thus, cognitive ability was expected to moderate the relationship between frame
and decision.
Experience
5) Reyna (2004) suggests that heuristic processing overrides analytical processing as
individuals gain experience. It was hypothesized that frame would influence women with
experience with breast cancer more than women with no experience of breast cancer;
thus, experience was expected to moderate the effect of frame on decision.
Sensation Seeking
6) Sensation seeking has been linked to various risky behaviors, including erratic driving,
promiscuous sexual behavior, and drug abuse (see Zuckerman, 1994 for review).
Therefore, it was hypothesized that the wording, or frame, of treatment options would not
influence treatment decisions for women who scored extremely high (risk takers) or
extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation seeking. Thus, sensation seeking was
expected to moderate the effect of frame on decisions.
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Need for Cognition
7) Greater need for cognition has been shown to be negatively associated with susceptibility
to the framing effect (Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon et al., 2004;
Smith & Levin, 1998). Therefore, it was hypothesized that frame would influence
treatment decisions in women with a low need for cognition to a greater extent than it
would for women high in need for cognition. Thus, need for cognition was expected to
moderate the relationship between frame and decision.
Participants
Using the Sample Power statistical program, a power analysis for a 2 x 2 interaction
showed that 132 women were needed to detect medium effect sizes (> .25) with 81% power. A
power analysis for a regression with two variables and an interaction yielded sufficient power
(power > .90) to detect medium effect sizes (> .25).
The sample consisted of sixty-eight young adult women (M age = 19.10 years, SD =
1.54) who were college students and sixty-six community-dwelling women aged sixty years and
older (M age = 70.76 years, SD = 7.10). All of the younger women were single; for older
women, 43.9% were married, 37.9% were widowed, 13.6% were divorced, 1.5% was never
married, and 3% were living as married. The sample was 94.8% Caucasian. There were 2
African American older women, 4 Asian younger women, and 1 younger woman reported as
other.
The college students were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes and
recruitment flyers posted around the campus of West Virginia University. College students
received extra credit in undergraduate psychology courses as a thank you for participation. The
older adults were recruited from senior centers, community facilities, and residential institutions,
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and through personal contacts and recruitment flyers posted in the community. Participants were
also recruited from the sample used for a National Institute of Health grant-funded study (R03;
OMB No. 0925-0001; Collaborative Everyday Problem-Solving: Gain or Loss, J. Strough
primary investigator). A total of 56.7% of the current sample participated in the grant-funded
study prior to participating in the current study. Both younger women (N= 17; 39.7%) and older
women (N= 49; 74.2%) were recruited from the grant-funded study. Immediately after the
participants completed the grant-funded study they were invited to participate in the current
study at that time, and if they agreed, they completed the current study. If they could not
complete the current study at that time, they were asked if they would like to participate in future
studies. Each person who agreed to be considered for a future study filled out an information
sheet with their contact information. The time between participation in the grant-funded study
and the current study varied from about 2 months for older women and 3 weeks for younger
women. Older adult participants were given $20.00 each as a “thank you” for participation in the
grant-funded study. Younger adult participants were given the choice of extra credit or $20.00
each as a “thank you” for participation in the grant-funded study. With the exception of income,
women who participated in the grant-funded study were not significantly different from women
who did not participate in the grant-funded study (see Table 2 and Table 3). In addition, the
women who did participate in the grant-funded study (M = 3.74, SD = .21) did not make
significantly different treatment decisions than did women who did not participate (M = 3.50, SD
= .24) in the grant-funded study, F (1, 133) = .54, p = .46.
Measures
Cancer treatment decision vignettes were used to manipulate the message frame.
Vignettes have been shown to be a useful way to examine decision making (Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1981). Participants were presented with three hypothetical situations: 91) breast
cancer, (2) general cancer and (3) non-cancer. A complete copy of the measures can be found in
Appendix A.
Breast Cancer Vignette
The breast cancer vignette was adapted from Tversky and Kaheman (1979) and presented
as follows:
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer. Otherwise, you are in
an excellent state of health. It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with
this type of breast cancer this year. There are two experimental treatment
programs that involve equal amounts of both drug therapy and radiation. Your
physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for each treatment
program. Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (see treatment
options below).
General Cancer Vignette
Participants were presented with a general (i.e., non-breast cancer specific) vignette to
determine generalizability of results. The vignette was taken from Fagley and Miller (1987).
The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which
could become standard treatments across the country. There are adequate
resources to implement only 1 program (see options below).
Non-cancer Vignette
Participants were presented with a non-cancer vignette to determine generalizability of
results. The vignette was taken from Simon, Fagley, and Halleran (2004).
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A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean. There are
600 people on the ship. Their lives are in danger. Two options are proposed.
Assume that the exact estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows:
(see options below).
Frame
The options for the each of the vignettes were framed either positively or negatively. The
wording of the options was based on the classic framing study by Tversky and Kahneman
(1979). Outcomes for the positively and negatively framed treatment programs were objectively
equivalent and would have equal expected outcomes. Although Tversky and Kahneman (1979)
scored their problems as categorical (i.e., risk taking or risk averse), a continuous measure of the
likelihood of choosing a more or less risky treatment was used in this study. Therefore,
participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale modified from Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002) the likelihood of choosing each option. The scale ranged from 1
= Definitely Would Choose Treatment Option A to 7 = Definitely Would Choose Treatment
Option B. Higher numbers indicated greater preference for risky options. Levin and colleagues
found a significant mean difference score of 1.09 (p < .001) for positive and negative framed
treatment programs.
Breast cancer vignette. For the breast cancer vignette, the positive and negative frames
were as follows:
Positive Frame
A) In treatment program A, 200 women will be cured. (risk averse)
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 women will be cured and a 2/3
chance that no women will be cured. (risk seeking)
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Negative Frame
A) In treatment program A, 400 women will die. (risk averse)
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that no women will die, and a 2/3
chance that 600 women will die. (risk seeking)
General cancer vignette. For the general cancer vignette, the positive and negative
frames were as follows:
Positive Frame
A) If treatment A is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 200 will be saved (risk
averse).
B) If treatment B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3
chance that no people will be saved (risk seeking).
Negative Frame
A) If treatment A is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 400 will die (risk
averse).
B) If treatment B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3
chance that 600 people will die (risk seeking)
Non-cancer vignette. For the non-cancer vignette, the positive and negative frames were
as follows:
Positive Frame
A) If option A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (risk averse).
B) If option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3
chance that none will be saved (risk seeking).
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Negative Frame
A) In option A, 400 people will die (risk averse).
B) In option B, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die, and a 2/3 chance that 600
people will die (risk seeking)
Sensation Seeking
According to Zuckerman (1994), sensation-seeking is a strong predictor of risky
behavior. The Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale (ImpSS, Zuckerman) is used as a way to
measure general risk-taking behavior. Although the ImpSS has not been validated on older
adults, currently the field lacks a better scale to access risk-taking propensity. Participants were
asked to state true or false as to whether they believe that each of 19 statements described them
(e.g., “I like doing things just for the thrill of it”, “I often do things in impulse”). Zuckerman
reported Cronbach’s alphas that range from .77 to .82. The ImpSS scale correlated highly with
Zuckerman’s longer Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS, r = .66). Participants received 1 point for
each “true” response, except for item 6, in which a “false” response received 1 point. Higher
scores indicated higher sensation seeking. Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .78.
The scale had a possible range from 0 to 19; younger women had an actual range of 0 to 17 (M =
9.59, SD = 4.04); older women had an actual range of 0 to 17 (M = 5.53, SD = 4.17; see Table
4).
Cognitive Ability
Crystallized and fluid intelligence. Intelligence was assessed using the original
Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT, Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990). The K-BIT yields
an overall intelligence score and separate measures of crystallized and fluid intelligence.
There are three sections: expressive vocabulary, definitions, and matrices. The expressive
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vocabulary section consists of pictures that the participant is asked to name (e.g., fire
hydrant). The definitions section consists of clues and words with letters missing. The
participant is asked to fill in the missing letters and spell the word (e.g., Santa’s entrance =
chimney). The definitions section is timed; 30 seconds is allowed for each questions. The
matrices section consists of pictures and relationships between pictures. Participants are
asked which of the given options goes best with the given pictures or fits the blank (e.g., a
truck goes with other vehicles). The measure is an adequate substitution for the more
commonly used WAIS (correlations between the two measures range from .52 to .75,
Kaufman & Kaufman). Test administrators were trained according to the instructions in
the K-BIT manual. Each research assistant must have correctly completed 3 practice
sessions in order to administer the test. The test took approximately 20 minutes for the
younger women to complete and 45 minutes for the older women to complete.
Crystallized intelligence. Crystallized intelligence scores were calculated,
according to the K-BIT manual, by summing the raw scores for the expressive vocabulary
and definitions sections and then translating the sum to a standardized score. Raw scores
were calculated by subtracting the numbers of errors from the highest item administered.
For the crystallized intelligence score, younger women’s scores ranged from 84 to 128 (M
= 100.81, SD = 9.44); older women’s scores ranged from 75 to 130 (M = 105.18, SD =
12.93; see Table 4).
Fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence scores were calculated, according to the KBIT manual, by translating the raw score for the matrices section into a standardized score.
Raw scores were calculated by subtracting the numbers of errors from the highest item
administered. For the fluid intelligence score, younger women’s scores ranged from 48 to
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128 (M = 103.38, SD = 11.98); older women’s scores ranged from 44 to 126 (M = 102.91,
SD = 15.97; see Table 4).
Composite score. A composite score was calculated, according to the K-BIT
manual, by summing the standardized scores for crystallized and fluid intelligence. The
sum was then translated into a standardized composite score. For the composite score,
younger women’s scores ranged from 67 to 124 (M = 102.23, SD = 9.05); older women’s
scores ranged from 61 to 132 (M = 104.15, SD = 13.96; see Table 4 for total sample
means).
Working memory. Forward and backward digit span tasks from the WAIS-R-III
(Weschler, 1997) were used to access working memory. For the forward digit span task,
participants were asked to repeat a sequence of numbers in the same order as the
administrator stated them. For the backward digit span task, participants were asked to
repeat a sequence of numbers in the opposite order in which the administrator presented
them. For participants from the NIH funded study, there was approximately 2 months
between assessment of working memory and completion of the decision-making tasks for
some of the participants. Therefore, data on working memory was collected but not
analyzed because this aspect of cognitive functioning is variable.
Experience. Experience has been shown to influence various aspects of the medical
decision-making process (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995; Snyder, 2004; Zwahr, 1999). To
assess personal experience, the participants were asked to indicate whether they had ever been
diagnosed with breast cancer (yes/no), the month and year of diagnosis, type of treatment
received, and whether the cancer was cured or is in remission. To assess vicarious experience,
the participants were asked if they had a close friend or relative who had been diagnosed with

The Framing of

31

breast cancer (yes/no), the relationship of the person diagnosed (e.g., relative or friend), how
close they feel to that person, and the extent to which they were involved in that person’s
medical decisions. Total experience was considered when the participant stated “yes” to at least
one of the personal or vicarious experience problems. Younger and older women did not
significantly differ on total experience or vicarious experience reported (see Table 5). No
younger women reported personal experience with breast cancer.
Self-rated health. The 4-item self-rated health scale from the Multilevel Assessment
Instrument (Lawton, Moss, Fulcomer & Kleban, 1982) was used to assess perceived health and
was used as background information. Participants were asked to rate their overall health at the
present time from (1) Excellent to (4) Poor. Participants were asked “Is your health now (1)
Better, (2) About the Same, or (3) Not as Good as it was 3 Years Ago?” Participants were asked
if their health problems stand in the way (1) Not at All, (2) A Little or (3) A Great Deal of doing
the things they want to do. Participants were asked “Compared with most other people your age,
would you say your health is: (1) Better, (2) The Same or (3) Not as Good. Raw scores were
reversed so that higher scores indicated better-perceived health. A total perceived health score
was computed by summing the scores across each item. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the
current sample was .76. The scale had a possible range from 4 to 16; younger women had an
actual range of 7 to 13 (M = 10.44, SD = 1.54); older women had an actual range of 4 to 13 (M =
9.25, SD = 2.12; see Table 4).
Type of cognitive processing and need for cognition. The 31-item Rational-Experiential
Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) was used to assess cognitive
processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic processing). The REI consists of two unipolar
subscales: a 19-item modified Need for Cognition scale (NFC, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) that
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examines analytical processing and a new 12-item Faith in Intuition (FI) scale developed to
examine heuristic processing. Participants were asked to rate on a 5 point Likert-type scale from
(1) Completely False to (5) Completely True the degree to which each statement described them.
Epstein and colleagues reported that both subscales were sufficiently reliable: NFC alpha = .77;
FI alpha = .80.
To calculate need for cognition and faith in intuition scores, the average of the items
within each subscale was computed. To compute the need for cognition score, scale items 1, 2,
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18 were reverse scored so that higher scores indicated a
higher need for cognition. No items needed to be reverse scored to compute the faith in intuition
score. Higher scores indicated a higher faith in intuition. To address the dual process
conceptualization of cognitive processing, need for cognition and faith in intuition were analyzed
as separate subscales.
To address the notion that cognitive processing may be a unitary process, a total
cognitive processing score was also computed by averaging all of the items. Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18 of the need for cognition scale, and all of the items on the faith in
intuition scale (i.e., numbers 19-30) were reversed scored. Higher scores indicated higher
analytical processing.
In the current sample the need for cognition subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .77; the
faith in intuition subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .80; and the total scale had a Cronbach’s
alpha of .76. Attempts to improve the reliability of the scale by dropping items failed. The total
cognitive processing (analytical and heuristic combined) scale had a possible range from 0 to 5;
younger women had an actual range of 1.74 to 3.90 (M = 2.95, SD = .40); older women had an
actual range of 2.00 to 3.83 (M = 2.91, SD = .47). The need for cognition scale had a possible
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range from 0 to 5; younger women had an actual range of 1.58 to 4.37 (M = 3.27, SD = .52);
older women had an actual range of 1.79 to 4.68 (M = 3.21, SD = .70). The faith in intuition
scale had a possible range from 0 to 5; younger women had an actual range of 1.75 to 4.67 (M =
3.57, SD = .54); older women had an actual range of 2.42 to 4.92 (M = 3.56, SD = .52; see Table
4 for descriptive information on older and younger women and total sample). Analyses were
conducted with the two subscales (need for cognition and faith in intuition) and the total
cognitive processing score.
Demographics information. A demographic questionnaire contained general questions
regarding sex, age, race, education, residency, income, marital status (i.e., married, living as
married, widowed, divorced, never married), living status (i.e., alone, with others), work history,
current employment and statistics courses taken (for younger women only). As background
health information, participants were asked to provide information regarding the gender of
physician, frequency of doctor visits, access to health care and general health conditions. As
background information, knowledge about breast cancer was assessed using Vaeth’s (1993) 16item scale. Participants were asked to state whether information concerning the risk factors and
demographic information about breast cancer was True or False. Participants received 1 point
for each correct answer (i.e., “true” response to true statement, “false” response to false
statement). The scale had a possible range from 0 to 16; younger women had an actual range of
8 to 15 (M = 11.43, SD = 1.70); older women had actual range of 7 to 15 (M = 11.11, SD = 1.87;
see Table 4).
Procedure
The study consisted of 1 session. The sessions took place either in 1) the Life-Span
Developmental Research Laboratory in the Life Sciences Building at West Virginia
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University, 2) various community senior centers, 3) residential living communities, and 4)
older women’s homes. Participants completed the study alone in a quiet, private area. The
study was described to the participants by the first author or a member of the research team
which consisted of undergraduate and graduate research assistants. Informed consent and
HIPAA authorization was obtained. The forward and backward digit span tasks were
completed first. The task took about 10 minutes for younger adults and 5 minutes for older
adults. The K-BIT was administered next. The test took approximately 20 minutes for the
younger women to complete and 45 minutes for the older women to complete. Then
participants were asked to complete the Decision Making Questionnaire, which consisted
of the remainder of the self-report questionnaires. Directions on how to complete the
questionnaires were thoroughly described and any questions were answered via verbal
explanation to the participant. The order of the questionnaires was follows: vignettes,
demographic information, the REI, the ImpSS, and the Knowledge Scale. The entire
session took approximately 1 hour for younger women and 1.5 hours for older women.
The breast cancer vignette was presented first to all participants and was counterbalanced
(i.e., half of the women received the positively framed vignette first and the other half
received the negatively framed vignette first). The general cancer and non-cancer vignettes
were then presented and were also counterbalanced for a total of 16 versions. The general
cancer and non-cancer vignette were used to examine generalizability, or whether women’s
decisions were specific to the breast cancer domain or were due to the wording of options
regardless of domain. In the primary analyses, frame was analyzed as a between-subjects
variable. The first vignette that each woman received served as the frame, either positive or
negative, and the women’s continuous score of the treatment option for that vignette served
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as the dependent variable in the analyses of the effect of frame on breast cancer treatment
decisions. Higher scores indicated riskier options.
Results
Before conducting analyses, missing data for the treatment decision ratings for each of
the vignettes was replaced using the overall mean within each domain and frame. For the
positively framed breast cancer vignette, 5% of the data was replaced (2 of younger women, 5 of
older women). For the negatively framed breast cancer vignette, 4% of the data replaced (3 of
younger women, 2 of older women). For the positively framed general cancer vignette, 4% of
the data was replaced (2 of younger women, 4 of older women). For the negatively framed
general cancer vignette, 5% of the data was replaced (1 of younger women, 6 of older women).
For the positively framed non-cancer vignette, 6% of the data was replaced (3 of younger
women, 5 of older women). For the negatively framed non-cancer vignette, 3% of the data was
replaced (2 of younger women, 2 of older women). There was no distinguishable pattern to the
missing data1.
Boxplots were used to screen for outliers separately for each vignette (breast cancer
positively framed, breast cancer negatively framed, general cancer positively framed, general
cancer negatively framed, non-cancer positively framed, non-cancer negatively framed). Results
indicated that no significant outliers were present. Skewness and kurtosis were used to examine
normality of the data. Although skewness and kurtosis values indicated a deviation from
normality (i.e., did not equal zero), the sample size was large enough that deviation from
normality would not make a substantive difference in analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).

1

Results of analyses conducted without missing data imputed were not significantly different than those reported
here. These data are available upon request.
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Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for age, education, race, marital status, experience, knowledge about
breast cancer, self-rated health, cognitive processing, need for cognition, faith in intuition,
sensation seeking, intelligence (total), crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, and income
were examined for both the younger and older adult age groups (see Table 4 and Table 5).
The Influence of Age and Frame on Treatment decision
To address research question 1, (How do age and framing of the message (positive or
negative) affect women’s choice of treatment options for breast cancer?) a hierarchical
regression was conducted to examine the affect of age and frame on treatment decision. Frame
was dummy coded; positive frame = 1, and negative frame = 0. Age and frame were predictor
variables and were entered in the first step of the regression. The interaction of age x frame was
computed, centered, and entered in the second step of the regression. Treatment decision was the
criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Age was entered as a continuous
variable in the regression. Results indicated that age and frame accounted for a significant
amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .14, F (2, 133) = 10.92, p < .001. Age was not a
predictor of treatment decision, t (133) = 1.21, p = .23. Frame significantly predicted treatment
decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .001. As predicted, women presented with the negative frame
endorsed riskier treatment decisions. The model that included the age x frame interaction
accounted for a significant account of the treatment decision variance, R2 = .23, F (3, 133) =
12.93, p < .001. The age x frame interaction term accounted for a significant portion of the
variance in treatment decision, t (133) = -3.83, p < .00 (see Table 6).
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The Age x Frame Interaction
In order to localize the age x frame effect found in the analysis for research question 1, a
2 (age group) x 2 (frame) ANOVA was conducted. Older (i.e., over the age of 60 years) and
younger (i.e., between the ages of 18-29 years) were recruited in order to examine age
differences. Thus, age was entered as a between-subjects categorical subject variable, frame was
a between-subjects independent variable, and the continuous rating of treatment decision was the
dependent variable. Results showed a significant main effect of frame, F (1, 133) = 23.07, p <
.01, partial η2 = .15, and a significant age x frame interaction, F (1, 133) = 14.98, p < .01, partial
η2 = .10. Follow-up ANOVAs showed that older women presented with the negative frame (M =
5.06, SD = 1.81) indicated a greater likelihood of choosing a risk-seeking treatment option than
did older women presented with the positive frame (M = 2.62, SD = 1.94). For younger women,
there were no significant differences in ratings for the negatively (M = 3.60, SD = 1.00) or
positively (M = 3.34, SD = 1.61) framed treatment options (see Figure 3). Thus, the hypothesis
that there would be an age x frame effect was supported. Frame influenced older women’s
decisions but did not influence in younger women’s decisions.
Cognitive Processing as a Mediator
To address research question 2, (Does type of cognitive processing mediate age
differences in treatment decision?) cognitive processing was examined using a mediation and a
mediation moderation model. According to Holmbeck (1997), structural equation modeling may
be the best strategy to examine mediators and moderators due to control of error; however, the
current sample size (N = 134) was too small to use the technique. In the current study, Baron and
Kenny’s (1986) criteria for establishing a mediated moderation model were used. The criteria are
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follows: first, age and frame must both have a significant effect on treatment decision
(determined in analysis for research question 1 above; see Paths a1 and a2 in Figure 4). Second,
for type of cognitive processing to mediate the relationship between age and treatment decision,
age must affect type of cognitive processing (see Path b1 in Figure 4) and type of cognitive
processing must affect treatment decision (Path b2 in Figure 4). Two hierarchical regression
analyses would test these requirements: (1) age, frame, and age x frame (centered and entered
into separate step of the regression) as predictors and type of cognitive processing as the criterion
variable; and (2) age, frame, and age x frame (centered and entered into separate step of the
regression) as the predictors and treatment decision as the criterion variable. To demonstrate
complete mediation, age would not affect treatment decision when type of processing was
controlled (see Path a1 in Figure 4). Mediated moderation would be indicated if age x frame
affected treatment decision (see Path c2 in Figure 4), and age x frame affected type of cognitive
processing (see Path c1 in figure 4), and type of cognitive processing affecting age (see Path b1 in
Figure 4). The final step in the criteria is tested via a regression with age, frame, type of
cognitive processing, age x frame, and type of cognitive processing x frame (each interaction
centered and entered in separate steps of the regression) as the predictors and treatment decision
as the criterion variable. For cognitive processing to moderate the relationship between age and
frame, the effect of age x frame on treatment decision must be reduced from the previous
regressions (1) and (2) above (as indicated by a decrease in the β weights).
The hierarchical regression conducted to answer research question 1 indicated that age
did not significantly affect treatment decision, t (133) = 1.21, p = .23; therefore, Baron and
Kenny’s (1986) criteria for establishing a mediation, or mediated moderation model were not
met. Thus, the hypothesis that cognitive processing would mediate the age x frame effect was not
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supported because there was no main effect of age on treatment decision. Cognitive processing
was examined as a predictor in the exploratory analyses described in the exploratory analyses
section.
Individual Characteristics as Moderator Variables
To address research question 3, individual difference characteristics were tested as
moderator variables. In order to establish that individual characteristic variables moderate the
relationship between frame and treatment decision, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria for
establishing moderation must be met. First, frame must be related to treatment decision
(determined in analysis for research question 1; see Path a in Figure 2). Second, the moderator
variable (individual characteristic) must be related to treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2).
Finally, the moderator variable x frame interaction must be significant in order to demonstrate a
moderator effect (see Path c in Figure 2). The first step was established in the analysis for
research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .00
(i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant). The second step in the moderator model was that each
moderator variable was a significant predictor of treatment decision. Analyses for each potential
moderator variable are described below.
Cognitive Ability
To establish that cognitive ability moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 1)
frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) cognitive ability must affect
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x cognitive ability interaction must
affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2). As noted above, step 1 was established in the
analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = 4.52, p < .00 (i.e., Path c in Figure 2 was significant). Analyses were conducted to test each
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index of cognitive ability (i.e., K-BIT composite as a measure of intelligence, K-BIT vocabulary
as a measure of crystallized intelligence, K-BIT vocabulary as a measure of fluid intelligence) as
a potential moderator.
Intelligence. A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of intelligence, as
assessed by the composite K-BIT score, on treatment decision. Intelligence was the predictor
and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable.
Intelligence did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .01, F (1, 133) = 1.13, p = .29
(Path b in Figure 2 was not significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was
not met; therefore, intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment
decision (see Table 7).
Crystallized intelligence. A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of
crystallized intelligence on treatment decision. Crystallized intelligence was the predictor and
treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Crystallized
intelligence did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .17, F (1, 133) = 3.84, p = .06
(Path b in Figure 2 was not significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was
not met; therefore, crystallized intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and
treatment decision (see Table 7).
Fluid intelligence. A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of fluid
intelligence on treatment decision. Fluid intelligence was the predictor and treatment decision
was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Fluid intelligence did not
significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .06, F (1, 133) = .46, p = .50 (Path b in Figure 2
was not significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore,

The Framing of

41

fluid intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see
Table 7).
Experience
To establish that experience moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 1)
frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) experience must affect treatment
decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x experience interaction must affect treatment
decision (see Path c in Figure 2). As noted earlier, step 1 was established in the analysis for
research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .00
(i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant). A linear regression was conducted to examine the
effect of experience on treatment decision. Experience was the predictor and treatment decision
was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Experience did not
significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .00, F (1, 133) = .15, p = .29 (Path b in Figure 2
was not significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore,
experience did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see Table 7).
Thus, the hypothesis that experience would moderate the relationship between frame and
decision was not supported.
Sensation Seeking
To establish that sensation seeking moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision,
1) frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) sensation seeking must affect
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x sensation seeking interaction must
affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2). As noted earlier, step 1 was established in the
analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = 4.52, p < .001 (i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant). A linear regression was conducted to
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examine the effect of sensation seeking on treatment decision. Sensation seeking was the
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous
variable. Sensation seeking did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .09, F (1, 133)
= 1.14, p = .29 (Path b in Figure 2 was not significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a
moderator effect was not met; therefore, sensation seeking did not moderate the relationship
between frame and treatment decision (see Table 7). The hypothesis that sensation seeking
would moderate the relationship of frame and decision was not supported.
Need for Cognition.
To establish that need for cognition moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision,
1) frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) need for cognition must affect
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x need for cognition interaction
must affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2). As noted earlier, step 1 was established
in the analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133)
= -4.52, p < .001 (i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant). A linear regression was conducted to
examine the effect of need for cognition on treatment decision. Need for cognition was the
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous
variable. Need for cognition (β = -.18), t (133) = -2.13, p < .05, significantly predicted treatment
decision, R2 = .03, F (1, 133) = 4.47, p < .05 (i.e., Path b in Figure 2 was significant). Women
who scored lower on the need for cognition scale endorsed riskier decisions than women who
scored higher on the need for cognition scale.
In order to establish that need for cognition moderated the effect of frame on treatment
decision, the frame x need for cognition interaction must also significantly affect treatment
decision. A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine the effect of frame and need for
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cognition on treatment decision. Frame and need for cognition were predictor variables and
were entered in the first step of the regression. The interaction of frame x need for cognition was
computed, centered and entered in the second step of the regression. Treatment decision was the
criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. The regression model that contained
frame, need for cognition, and the frame x need for cognition interaction was significant, R2 =
.16, F (2, 133) = 12.11, p < .001. However, analysis of the beta weights indicated that frame was
the only significant predictor variable, t (133) = -4.37, p < .001. The frame x need for cognition
interaction was not a significant predictor of treatment decision (Path c in Figure 2 was not
significant). Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore, need for
cognition did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see Table 8).
Thus, the hypothesis that need for cognition would moderate the relationship of frame and
decision was not supported.
Exploratory Analyses
Generalizability. In order to examine whether the frame effect found in the analysis
conducted to address research question 1 was specific to the breast cancer domain, a 3 (domain)
x 2(frame) x 2(age group) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted. Results indicated
significant main effects of domain, F (2, 131) = 5.19, p < .05, partial η2 = .07, and frame, F (2,
131) = 5.19, p < .05, partial η2 = .07. There were significant two-way interactions for frame x
age group, F (1, 132) = 25.31, p < .00, partial η2 = .16, and domain x frame, F (2, 132) = 6.23, p
< .05, partial η2 = .09. The three-way interaction of domain x frame x age group was also
significant, F (2, 131) = 4.65, p < .05, partial η2 = .07.
To localize the effect and examine the question of generalizability, a 3 (domain) x 2
(frame) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted for each age group. For younger women,
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there was a significant main effect for domain, F (2, 66) = 3.49, p < .05, partial η2 = .16. Simple
contrasts that compared the general cancer and non-cancer domains to the breast cancer domain
were conducted to follow up the significant main effect. Results showed a significant difference
between the non-cancer and breast cancer domains, F (1, 67) = 6.83, p < .01, partial η2 = .09.
Young women made riskier decisions in the non-cancer domain as compared to the breast cancer
domain (see Table 9). There was no main effect of frame or a domain x frame interaction for the
young women in this sample.
For older women, a 3 (domain) x 2 (frame) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted
for older women. Results indicated a significant two-way interaction of domain and frame, F (2,
64) = 8.97, p < .00, η2 = .02. Paired sample t-tests that compared the positive and negative
frames in each domain were used to follow up the significant two-way interaction in order to
examine the generalizability of the results. Results indicated a significant difference in older
women’s decisions in the positive frame as compared to the negative frame in all three domains:
breast cancer domain, t (65) = -2.13, p < .05, general cancer domain, t (65) = -5.51, p < .001, and
non-cancer domain, t (65) = -3.21, p < .05 (see Table 9 and Figure 5). That is, for older women,
frame affected decisions in all three domains (breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer).
Older women made riskier decisions when presented with the negative frame, regardless of
domain. Domain did make a difference in younger adults’ decisions; however, frame did not.
Thus, results of the current study can not be explained as specific to the breast cancer domain.
To localize the domain x frame interaction for older women, paired sample t-tests were
conducted for each domain combination in each frame. In the positive frame, older women’s
decisions in the general cancer domain (M = 3.20, SD = 2.02) were significantly different from
decisions in the breast cancer domain (M = 2.81, SD = 1.94), t (66) = -1.54, p = .13. In the
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positive frame, older women’s decisions in the non-cancer domain (M = 3.77, SD = 2.10) were
significantly different than decisions in the breast cancer, t (66) = -4.22, p < .00, and general
cancer, t (66) = -2.34, p < .05, domains. In the positive frame, older women made significantly
riskier decisions in the non-cancer domain as compared to both the breast cancer and general
cancer domains. There were no significant domain differences in older women’s decisions in the
negative frame.
Self-rated health. In order to examine the effect of self-rated health on treatment decision,
a linear regression was conducted. Self-rated health was the predictor variable and treatment
decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Results indicated that
self-rated health (β = -.02) did not account for a significant amount of treatment decision
variability, R2 = .02, F (1, 133) = .037, p = .85 (see Table 4 for descriptive information on selfrated health).
Comfort speaking to physician. Participants were asked to rate on a Likert-type scale
from 1 (Not At All Comfortable) to 5 (Very Comfortable) how comfortable they were speaking to
their physician about their health. In order to examine the effect of level of comfort speaking to
physician on treatment decision, a linear regression was conducted. Level of comfort speaking
to physician was the predictor variable and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment
decision was a continuous variable. Results indicated that level of comfort speaking to physician
(β = .08) did not account for a significant amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .01, F (1,
133) = .95, p = .33.
Comfort asking for second opinion. Participants were asked to rate on a Likert-type scale
from 1 (Not At All Comfortable) to 5 (Very Comfortable) how comfortable they were asking for a
second opinion. In order to examine the effect of comfort asking for a second opinion on
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treatment decision, a linear regression was conducted. Comfort asking for a second opinion was
the predictor variable and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a
continuous variable. Results indicated that comfort asking for a second opinion (β = .04) did not
account for a significant amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .04, F (1, 133) = .24, p =
.63.
Cognitive processing and treatment decision. Although Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
criteria for establishing cognitive processing as a mediator or moderator of the age x frame
interaction were not met, as an exploratory analysis, a linear regression was conducted to
examine the effect of cognitive processing on treatment decision. Cognitive processing was the
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable.
Results indicated that the overall measure of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical and heuristic
processing combined) was not related to treatment decision, R2 = .16, F (1, 131) = 3.61, p = .06
(see Table 10). When cognitive processing was examined as a dual process, heuristic processing
(i.e., faith in intuition) was not related to treatment decision, R2 = .02, F (1, 131) = .04, p = .85
(see Table 10). However, analytical processing (i.e., need for cognition) was significantly
related to treatment decision, R2 = .18, F (1, 131) = 4.45, p < .05. Women with lower need for
cognition made riskier decisions than did women high greater need for cognition (see Table 10).
The influence of age and frame on cognitive processing. A hierarchical regression was
conducted to examine the effect of age, frame, and age x frame on cognitive processing (Paths
b1, a1, and c2 in Figure 4) in an attempt to better understand the age x frame interaction. Age and
frame were predictor variables and were entered in the first step of the regression. Frame was
dummy coded; positive frame = 1 and negative frame = 0. The interaction of age x frame was
computed, centered and entered in the second step of the regression. Total cognitive processing
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score (i.e., analytical and heuristic processing combined) was the criterion. Age was entered as a
continuous variable. Results indicated that age and frame did not account for a significant
amount of the variance in total cognitive processing, R2 = .02, F (2, 133) = 1.30, p = .28 (Paths b1
and a1 in Figure 4 were not significant). In addition, the age x frame interaction did not account
for a significant proportion of the variance in cognitive processing, R2 = .04, F (3, 133) = 1.62, p
= .19 (Path c2 in Figure 4 was not significant).
Recent statistics course. Younger women were asked if they had recently taken a
statistics course (yes or no). Eighteen women indicated that they had recently taken a statistics
course and 50 women indicated that they had not recently taken a statistics course. To examine
whether recently taking a statistics course influenced susceptibility to the framing effect, a
Univariate ANOVA was conducted with statistics course taken as the independent variable and
treatment decision as the dependent variable. Treatment decision was a continuous variable.
Results indicated that recently taking a statistics course did not affect treatment decision, F (1,
67) = 2.42, p = .12, partial η2 = .04.
Decisions for breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer. Younger and older women
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale modified from Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002)
the likelihood of choosing each option. The scale ranges from 1 = Definitely Would Choose
Treatment Option A to 7 = Definitely Would Choose Treatment Option B. The option “4” would
be equivalent to the participant rating no preference between the two options. For both the
positive and negative frame in the breast cancer domain and general cancer domains, a greater
percentage of younger women chose option “4” than did older women. In the non-cancer
domain, a greater percentage of younger women chose option “4” than did older women in the
negative frame but not the positive frame (see Table 11).
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Discussion
The Interaction of Age and Frame
The hypothesis that frame would have more of an effect on older women’s treatment
decisions about breast cancer than on younger women’s treatment decisions about breast cancer
was supported. Frame influenced older women’s decisions but did not influence younger
women’s decisions. When presented with a negatively framed treatment option (i.e., worded in
terms of number of women who would die), older women endorsed riskier decisions than when
presented with a positively framed treatment option (i.e., worded in terms of number of women
who would live; see Figure 3). This is consistent with the findings from the classic framing
study (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) that negatively framed messages lead to riskier decisions
than positively framed messages. When options were worded in terms of number of deaths,
older women reported that they would choose a treatment option that had a “chance” to save a
greater number of persons instead of endorsing a treatment option that was reported to be a “sure
thing” and would only save a small number of persons. However, for younger women, there was
no main effect for frame; therefore, the hypothesis that frame would affect treatment decision, or
that positively worded treatment options would lead to more risk averse decisions, was only
partially supported.
For younger women, there was no significant difference in treatment decision regardless
of the way in which the treatment options were worded. This finding is inconsistent with the
literature. Very little research has examined the effect of age on frame; thus, most of the
literature to date has reported the effect of frame on samples of younger adults. Although
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Kuhberger (1998) reports that effect sizes for frame are small to moderate, the majority of the
literature on framing does find that the ways in which messages are worded influences decisions
(see Kuhberger for a review). In the current study, frame did not influence younger women’s
decisions in any domain (i.e., breast cancer, general cancer, non-cancer); whereas, frame
influenced older women’s decisions in all domains (i.e., breast cancer, general cancer, noncancer). This inconsistent finding for younger women is interesting given the number of studies
in the literature that show a framing effect. Perhaps this finding is due to experience with test
taking in general. Undergraduate college students are offered extra credit to participate in
research studies, and there are generally quite a few studies for which they can volunteer.
Perhaps the younger women in the sample have participated in research before and have
experience with the test taking process. However, it should be noted that the younger adults in
other studies that show a framing effect may also have experience with general test taking and
research participation. In addition, examination of the means (see Table 9) shows a slight trend
toward the framing effect in the younger women in the same direction as that of the older
women. Although a power analysis showed the sample to have sufficient power to detect
medium effect sizes, Kuhberger (1998) states that the effects of frame are small to moderate.
Perhaps a larger sample size would show an effect for frame for younger women.
The finding that the negative frame leads to riskier decisions for older women may be
due to the idea of perceived time left to live, or future time perspective. According to Lang and
Carstensen (2004) older individuals have a more limited future time perspective than do younger
individuals. Future time perspective has been shown to influence health behaviors (Yarcheski,
Mahon, Yarcheski, & Cannella, 2004). Perhaps older women perceived that they had a more
limited time left to live and therefore were more likely to endorse alternatives that would
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increase the chance of survival. In addition, perhaps, older adults feel that they have more things
to accomplish before death so they would want to take chances that may increase survival.
The literature to date is inconsistent as to the effect of age on the susceptibility of the
framing effect. Few studies have examined the interaction of age and frame. Mayhorn, Fisk,
and Whittle (2002) examined the influence of age on medical and financial decisions and
suggested that there are minimal age differences. McKee (2001) examined medical decision
making and found that younger adults may be slightly more influenced by the frame than are
older adults. The current study indicates that there are age differences in the susceptibility of
frame; however, those differences may not be due to individual differences in cognitive capacity,
processing, or experience, but may be due to a person’s future time perspective. Future studies
need to examine how frame influences the process of medical decision making in older adults,
younger adults, and terminally ill patients in order to test the future time perspective hypothesis.
Processing as a Mediator
Type of cognitive processing was expected to mediate the significant interaction of age
and frame. Although chronological age is often associated with poorer decision making and
problem solving (Thorton & Dumke, 2005), age is merely a marker, or proxy, variable. That is,
age in itself does not cause changes in decision making but may be associated with another
variable that does. Type of cognitive processing was expected to account for age differences in
the effect of frame. The hypothesis was not supported. Type of cognitive processing (i.e.,
analytical and heuristic combined), did not affect treatment decisions (see Table 10). When
analytic and heuristic processing were examined as dual processes, faith in intuition (i.e.,
heuristic processing) was not associated with treatment decisions. Need for cognition (i.e.,
analytical processing), however, was associated with treatment decision.
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Need for cognition. The hypothesis that frame would influence treatment decision in
women with a low need for cognition to a greater extent than it would for women high in need
for cognition was not supported. Need for cognition did significantly affect treatment decision;
women who scored lower in need for cognition made riskier decisions regardless of how
information was framed. However, there was not an interaction of frame and need for cognition;
therefore, need for cognition did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment
decision (see Table 8). This is inconsistent with previous research that indicated need for
cognition was negatively associated with susceptibility of framing effects (Chatterjee, Heath,
Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon et al., 2004; Smith & Levin, 1998). There was trend towards
significance for the interaction. Perhaps with a larger sample size the effect would emerge.
Thus, of the variables examined, need for cognition seems the most promising predictor of
treatment decisions.
There is a lack of measures available to examine heuristic and analytical processing. The
literature to date lacks information on the construct validity of the Rational-Experiential
Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Although the need for cognition
scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) has been used numerous times, the version used in the REI
was a shortened version with 19 items. There is a lack of information on the construct validity of
the short version of the need for cognition scale used in the current study. Epstein and
colleagues reported reliability of .77 for the need for cognition subscale and .80 for the faith in
intuition (FI) subscale. In the current sample the need for cognition subscale also had reliability
of .77, and the faith in intuition subscale also had reliability of .80. Although Epstein and
colleagues state that the reliabilities are acceptable, one could expect higher reliabilities of scales
with those number of items (i.e., NFC = 19 items, FI = 12 items). Future studies need to be
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conducted to examine the reliability and construct validity of the REI. Perhaps better measures
to examine heuristic and analytical processing would indicate that cognitive processing
influences susceptibility of the framing effect.
Potential Moderators
Cognitive ability. The hypothesis that women with low cognitive ability scores would be
influenced more by the frame than would individuals who scored higher on cognitive ability was
not supported. Neither cognitive ability; intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT composite score), fluid
intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT matrices scores), nor crystallized intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT
vocabulary score), was significantly related to treatment decision (see Table 7). The current
sample was homogenous. The women were highly educated and had high scores on the
cognitive ability measures; therefore, it was not possible to thoroughly examine the influence
that cognitive ability would have on susceptibility to the framing effect due to restriction of
range.
Experience. The hypothesis that frame would influence women with experience with
breast cancer more than women with no experience of breast cancer was not supported.
Experience was not significantly related to treatment decision (see Table 7). There were no
younger adults in the sample who had personal experience with breast cancer, as was expected.
It is rare for women under the age of 30 years to be diagnosed with breast cancer (ACS, 2005).
Vicarious experience, or experience with breast cancer through a friend or family member’s
diagnosis, was also considered experience. Although both personal and vicarious experience
have been shown to influence decision making with everyday problems (Patrick & Strough,
2004); personal experience with a health problem may be conceptually different from vicarious
experience with a health problem. Only a small number of older women reported personal
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experience with breast cancer (N = 11 or 16.7%). A larger number of women with personal
experience with breast cancer would have allowed a better examination of the effect of
experience on treatment decisions.
Sensation seeking. The hypothesis that frame would not influence treatment decisions for
women who scored extremely high (risk takers) or extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation
seeking was not supported. It was expected that general risk-taking propensity would override
the influence of frame. That is, regardless of the way in which options were worded, women
high in sensation seeking were expected to make riskier decisions; whereas, women low in
sensation seeking were expected to make less risky decisions. Although younger women scored
higher than older women on sensation seeking; it was not related to treatment decision (see Table
7). Perhaps general risk-taking propensity was not related to treatment decision due to the
measure used to assess risk taking. There were very few scales available to measure general
risk-taking propensity. The sensation-seeking measure was the best available at the time of the
current study. The sensation seeking measure assessed risk taking in behaviors related to general
activities (e.g., trip planning). There were no questions that dealt with risk taking in health
behaviors. Perhaps risk taking in the domain of health may be qualitatively different than other
domains (e.g., driving behavior); thus, perhaps a risk-taking scale that examines risky behavior
specifically in the domain of health would yield different results.
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the current study is the self-report nature of predicted behavior in
response to a hypothetical vignette. Participants were asked to report on how they would react if
they were faced with a similar situation. Although vignettes have been shown to be a useful
way to examine problem-solving strategies (Berg, 1989; Blanchard-Fields, et al., 1995; Watson
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& Blanchard-Fields, 1998), one cannot be certain how they will react unless faced with actual
problem. Researchers may draw information from the research conducted using laboratory
experimental methods (Johnson, 1993; Berg, Johnson, Meegan, & Strough, 2004); however,
reactions to real-world situation may differ from those in the laboratory. It is possible that older
adults may react differently if they were actually faced with a similar situation. In addition, it is
unlikely that women diagnosed with breast cancer would be presented with probability statistics
worded the same as the vignettes used in the current study. Participants, particularly older
women, stated that the vignettes were “difficult to answer.” The wording of the treatment
options may have been confusing, perhaps more confusing than the way options are presented to
women in real-world situations. Future studies should examine the decision-making process of
women actually diagnosed with the disease. The best strategy would be longitudinal studies that
examine the ways in which individuals diagnosed with the disease make decisions throughout
the course of the disease.
Another limitation is the use of a convenience sample. Individuals who volunteer to
participate in studies tend to very healthy, more educated, and more motivated than the general
population. In addition, this sample was highly homogenous. The sample consisted of highly
educated, middle class, predominantly Caucasian women. Given the health disparities between
races (Myers, Lewis & Parker-Dominguez, 2003), older adults of different races and ethnic
backgrounds would likely respond differently to the vignettes. Researchers should strive to
oversample minorities in order to have a better understanding of racial and ethnic differences in
medical decision making. In addition, in the future, a more diverse population with varying
degrees of education should be examined.
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Conclusions
Findings from the current study indicate that the ways in which treatment options are
worded influences the treatment options that older women endorse when presented with a breast
cancer vignette. Health professionals can draw upon these results when developing ways to
present various treatment options to patients. Women diagnosed with breast cancer also need to
be aware of the effect that wording alone can have on treatment decisions. In addition, the
results contribute to the literature that examines age differences in the framing effect. Studies
that examine age differences in the framing effect need to be conducted using other designs and
other types of wording options (e.g., survival curves) in order to gain a better understanding of
the framing effect phenomena.
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Table 1
Cognitive Processing: Heuristic Versus Analytical (modified from Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; p. 312).
Heuristic System
1. Holistic
2. Affective: pleasure-pain oriented
3. Associationistic connections
4. Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past
experiences
5. Encodes reality in concrete images,
metaphors, and narratives
6. More rapid processing: oriented toward
immediate action
7. Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is
believing”

Analytic System
1. Analytic
2. Logical: reason oriented (what is
sensible)
3. Logical connections
4. Behavior medicated by conscious
appraisal of events
5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols,
words, and numbers
6. Slower processing: oriented toward
delayed action
7. Requires justification via logic and
evidence
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Women Who Did and Did Not Participate in the NIH-Funded Study
From
NIH
Study
Mean

SD

Not From
NIH
Study
Mean

Significance
Test
SD

F (1, 133)

n2
(partial)

p

Education (years)

13.63

2.01

13.66

1.19

.01

.94

.00

Knowledge about
Breast Cancer

11.37

1.66

11.14

1.94

.55

.46

.00

Self-Rated Health

9.86

2.05

9.86

1.79

.00

.98

.00

Analytical
Processing

2.94

.46

2.93

.42

.00

.93

.00

Need for Cognition

3.24

.65

3.25

.57

.00

.96

.00

Faith in Intuition

3.55

.52

3.58

.55

.07

.80

.00

Sensation Seeking

7.11

4.71

8.22

4.33

1.99

.16

.02

Intelligence

104.17

12.27

101.93

10.94

1.20

.28

.01

Crystallized
Intelligence

104.68

11.91

100.71

10.53

4.05

.05

.03

Fluid Intelligence

103.76

13.03

102.34

15.33

.33

.56

.00

Income ($)

16973

17322

10862

12948

5.059

.03

.04
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Table 3
Experience with Breast Cancer for Women From and Not From the NIH Study
From NIH Study
Not From NIH Study
Percentage (from NIH) Percentage (not from NIH)

X2

p

Total
Experience

56.6%

72.4%

3.56

.06

Personal
Experience

52.6%

70.7%

1.25

.26

Vicarious
Experience

47.4%

29.3%

4.49

.05

68

The Framing of
Table 4
Descriptive Information for Older and Younger Women
Total

Older
Mean

Women

Younger

Women

SD

Mean

SD

F (1, 133)

η2
(partial)

p

Mean

SD

Age (years)

44.54

26.41

Education (years)

13.64

1.70

13.39

2.13

13.88

1.09

2.81

.09

.02

Knowledge about
Breast Cancer

11.27

1.79

11.11

1.87

11.43

1.70

1.08

.30

.01

Self-Rated Health

9.86

1.94

9.25

2.12

10.44

1.54

13.72

.00

.09

Cognitive Processing

3.37

.42

2.91

.47

2.95

.41

.23

.63

.00

Need for Cognition

3.24

.61

3.21

.70

3.28

.52

.41

.53

.00

Faith in Intuition

3.56

.53

3.56

.52

3.57

.54

.01

.94

.00

Sensation Seeking

8.12

4.21

5.53

4.17

9.59

4.04

32.75

.00

.20

Intelligence

103.20

11.72

104.15

13.96

102.27

9.05

.85

.36

.01

Crystallized
Intelligence

102.96

11.47

105.18

12.92

100.81

9.44

5.02

.03

.04

Fluid Intelligence

103.14

14.03

102.91

15.97

103.38

11.98

.04

.85

.00

Income ($)

14382

15820

21969

17406

6911

9464

39.01

.00

.23
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Experience with Breast Cancer for Older and Younger Women
Total

Older Women

Younger Women

Percentage

Percentage

Percentage

Total
63.4%
Experience

62.1%

64.7%

.10

.76

Personal
8.2%
Experience

16.7%

0.0%

12.35

.00

Vicarious
60.4%
Experience

56.1%

64.7%

1.05

.31

X2

p
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Table 6
Summary of Hierarchical Regression of Age and Frame on Treatment Choice (N = 134)
Variable
Step 1

B

Age
Frame

SE B

β

t

p

.01

.01

.10

1.21

.23

-1.34

.30

-.37

-4.52 .00

.01

.01

.11

1.40

-1.34

.28

-.37

-4.75 .00

-.04

.01

-.30

-3.83 .00

Step 2
Age
Frame
Age x Frame

R2 =.14 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .09 for Step2.

.17
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Table 7
Summary of Separate Linear Regressions of Cognitive Ability, Experience, and Sensation
Seeking Predicting Treatment Choice (N= 134)
t

p

R2

.09

1.52

.13

.01

.01

.17

.60

.06

.03

.01

.01

.06

.68

.50

.06

Experience

-.13

.33

-.09

-.38

.70

.00

Sensation
Seeking

-.04

.04

-.19

-1.00

.32

.01

Variable

B

SE B

β

Intelligence

.01

.01

Crystallized
Intelligence

.03

Fluid
Intelligence
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Table 8
Summary of Hierarchical Regression of Frame and Need for Cognition on Treatment Choice (N = 134)
Variable

B

SE B

β

t

p

-1.29

.24

-.35

-4.47

.00

-.45

.30

-.15

-1.86

.06

-1.29

.30

-.35

-4.36

.00

Need for Cognition

-.45

.24

-.15

-1.85

.07

Frame x Need for Cognition

.22

.49

.04

.455

.65

Model 1
Frame
Need for Cognition
Model 2
Frame

R2 = .40 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .00
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Table 9
Older and Younger Women’s Means Decision (Standard Error) in All Domains

Breast
Cancer

Older
Women
Positive Negative Total
Frame
Frame
2.81a
4.97a
3.89
(.21)
(.20)
(.15)

Younger
Women
Positive Negative Total
Frame
Frame
3.68
3.87
3.78d
(.21)
(.19)
(.15)

Total
Positive Negative Total
Frame
Frame
3.25
4.42
3.83
(.15)
(.14)
(.11)

General 3.20b
Cancer (.20)

4.77b
(.20)

3.99
(.16)

3.71
(.20)

4.11
(.19)

3.91
(.16)

3.46
(.14)

4.44
(.14)

3.95
(.11)

NonCancer

3.77c
(.22)

4.77c
(.21)

4.27
(.17)

4.18
(.21)

4.29
(.20)

4.24d
(.17)

3.97
(.15)

4.53
(.15)

4.25
(.12)

Total

3.26
(.16)

4.84
(.15)

4.05
(.13)

3.86
(.16)

4.09
(.15)

3.98
(.12)

3.56
(.12)

4.47
(.11)

4.01
(.09)

Note: Matching letters in each row equals significant difference. Matching letters in each
column equals significant difference.
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Table 10
Summary of Separate Linear Regressions of Cognitive Processing, Need for Cognition, and
Faith in Intuition on Treatment Choice (N = 134)
Variable

t

p

R2

-.16

-1.90

.06

.16

.26

-.18

-2.11

.04

.18

.30

.02

.20

.85

.02

B

SE B

β

Cognitive Processing

-.69

.36

Need for Cognition

-.54

Faith in Intuition

.05
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Table 11
Frequencies of Treatment Decision Ratings for the Total Sample and Older and Younger Women

Breast Cancer +
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing
Breast Cancer 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing
General Cancer +
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing
General Cancer 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing

Total

Older Women

Younger Women

Percentage

Percentage

Percentage

X2

p

21.6
15.7
7.5
31.3
8.2
3.7
6.7
5.2

34.8
16.7
6.1
21.2
1.5
1.5
10.6
7.6

8.8
14.7
8.8
41.2
14.7
5.9
5.9
2.9

1.30
.97
.19
4.13
.08
.03
.10

.25
.33
.66
.04
.78
.86
.76

5.2
7.5
9.0
33.6
16.4
16.7
17.9
3.7

9.1
6.1
1.5
21.2
15.2
9.1
34.8
3.0

1.5
8.8
16.2
45.6
17.6
4.4
1.5
4.4

.05
.19
.09
4.71
1.06
.15
.21

.83
.66
.76
.03
.30
.70
.65

15.7
12.7
10.4
36.6
9.0
6.0
5.2
4.5

30.3
9.1
6.1
28.8
3.0
6.1
10.6
6.1

1.5
16.2
14.7
44.1
14.7
5.9
0
2.9

.18
.56
.33
6.39
.16
.13

.67
.45
.56
.01
.69
.72

3.0
11.2
6.7
31.3
15.7
11.2
15.7
5.2

6.1
7.6
3.0
22.7
10.6
12.1
28.8
9.1

0
14.7
10.3
39.7
20.6
10.3
2.9
1.5

.42
.11
4.26
.86
.47
.16

.52
.74
.04
.35
.49
.74

Table continues on next page
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Table 11 continued
Non-cancer +
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing
Non-cancer 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Missing

10.4
9.7
11.9
28.4
13.4
9.0
11.2
6.0

18.2
13.6
3.0
27.3
9.1
1.5
19.7
7.6

2.9
5.9
20.6
29.4
17.6
16.2
2.9
4.4

4.5
6.0
9.7
31.3
14.2
13.4
17.9
3.0

9.1
4.5
4.5
28.8
6.1
12.1
31.8
3.0

0
7.4
14.7
33.8
22.1
14.7
4.4
2.9

.20
.30
.24
3.68
.62
.09
.22

.65
.58
.63
.06
.43
.76
.64

.12
.25
4.59
.52
.69
.57

.73
.62
.03
.47
.41
.45
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Figure 1. Mediator Model (from Baron & Kenny, 1986; p. 1176)
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a

b

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable
c
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Figure 2. Moderator Model (from Baron & Kenny, 1986; p. 1174)

Predictor

Moderator

a

b
c

Predictor x Moderator

Treatment Decision
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Figure 3. Older Women: Age x Frame Interaction
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Figure 4. Mediated Moderation Model (from Baron & Kenny, 1986; p. 1179)
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Figure 5. Older Women’s Decisions in Each Domain
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Appendix A: Decision-making Questionnaire
Please think about the following situation.
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer. Otherwise, you are in an excellent
state of health. It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer
this year. There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both
drug therapy and radiation. Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for
each treatment program.

Please list all of the different ways that you would deal with the situation. That is, write as
many different solutions as you can think of. Please put each solution on a different line.
Please place an “X” next to the solution that you think is the BEST.
_______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

The Framing of

Would you want to talk to someone about the situation? (circle one)

Yes

84

No

If yes, who would you talk to? Please list your relationship with this person. For
example: friend, spouse, etc. List all of the people you would talk to. Please put each on a
separate line.
___________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________

___________________________________

______________________________________
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Please think about the situation again.
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer. Otherwise, you are in an excellent
state of health. It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer
this year. There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both
drug therapy and radiation. Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for
each treatment program.

A) In treatment program A, 200 women will be cured.

B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 women will be cured and a 2/3
chance that no women will be cured.

Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option B
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Please think about the situation again.
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer. Otherwise, you are in an excellent
state of health. It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer
this year. There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both
drug therapy and radiation. Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for
each treatment program.

A) In treatment program A, 400 women will die.

B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that no women will die, and a 2/3
chance that 600 women will die.

Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option B
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Please think about the following situation.
The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which could
become standard treatments across the country.
There are adequate resources to implement only 1 treatment program.

A. If treatment 1 is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 200 will be cured.

B. If treatment 2 is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3
chance that no people will be cured.

Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option B
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Please think about the following situation.
A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean. There are 600
people on the ship. Their lives are in danger. Two options are proposed. Assume that the exact
estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows:
A. If option A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
B. If option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3
chance that none will be saved.
Please rate the likelihood of choosing an option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Option B
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Please think about the following situation.
The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which could
become standard treatments across the country.
There are adequate resources to implement only 1 treatment program.

A. If treatment 1 is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 400 will die.
B. If treatment 2 is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3 chance
that 600 people will die.
Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Treatment
Option B
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Please think about the following situation.

90

A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean. There are 600
people on the ship. Their lives are in danger. Two options for saving the passengers are
proposed. Assume that the exact estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows:
A. In option A, 400 people will die.
B. In option B, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die, and a 2/3 chance that 600
people will die.
Please rate the likelihood of choosing an option (circle one).
1
Definitively
Would
Choose
Option A

2

3

4

5

6

7
Definitively
Would
Choose
Option B

The Framing of

Information about you
1.

Sex (circle one)

2.

Age

3.

Race

__________

Male

Female

years

Date of Birth: ______________

African American
Asian
Caucasian
Hispanic
Other

__________
__________
__________
__________
__________ Specify __________

4.

Highest Education
High school
__________
Some college
__________
4-year college degree
__________
Graduate degree __________

5.

What city/town and state are you a permanent resident of?
City/town

______________________________

State

______________________________

6. Your current yearly income
Less than $10,000 __________
$10,001 - $20,000 __________
$20,001 - $30,000 __________
$30,001 - $40,000 __________
$40,001 - $50,000 __________
$50,001 - $60,000 __________
More than $60,000 __________
7. Number of children (living or deceased)
8.

Religious affiliation
Jewish
Protestant
Roman Catholic
Other
None

__________

_________
__________
__________
__________ (specify _________________________)
__________
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9. What is your marital status, are you:
1.) Married (indicate number of years married________)
2.) Not married, but living together as married (indicate number of years______)
3.) Widowed (indicate number of years married_________and number of years
widowed_______)
4.) Divorced (indicate number of years married_________ and number of years
divorced______)
5.) Never married
6.) Other
10. Do you currently live:
a. alone
b. with a spouse
c. with a friend/not related
d. with relatives (specify relationship_________________)
e. with others (specific relationship__________________)
11. What kind of work have you done most of your life?_______________
For what kind of business, company or agency is that? _____________
12. What is your current work status? Are you:
a. Employed full time
b. Employed part time
c. Retired
d. Unemployed
e. Homemaker
f. Other (specify________________)
13. How long have you been a patient of your family physician?
Years _______
Months _______
14. What is the gender of your physician? (circle one) Male

Female

15. How comfortable are you speaking to your physician about your health? (circle one)
1
Not At All
Comfortable

2
Somewhat
Uncomfortable

3
Neutral

4
Comfortable

5
Very
Comfortable
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16. How comfortable would you feel asking for a 2nd opinion?
1
Not At All
Comfortable

3
Neutral

2
Somewhat
Uncomfortable

4
Comfortable

5
Very
Comfortable

17. Think about the past year, how many times did you go to your doctor?
________________ Number of times

18. Health Insurance Information
Do you have health
insurance?
If yes, is your health care
provided by private
insurance?
Is your health insurance
related to a current or
former employer?
Do you receive benefits
from Medicare?
Do you receive benefits
from Medicaid?
Do you have prescription
drug benefits?
Are you a member of an
HMO?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

19. How much choice do you have in choosing a physician?
1
No Choice At
All

2
Little Choice

3
Some Choice

4
Mostly Up To
Me

5
Totally Up To
Me
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20. How easy is it for you to get to your doctor? (circle one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Extremely Difficult Somewhat Neutral
Fairly
Easy
Extremely
Difficult
Difficult
Easy
Easy
21. Please list all health-related conditions from which you currently suffer.
____________________________
____________________________
____________________________
____________________________
____________________________
22.

__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________

About how many days have you spent in the hospital in the past 12 months?
________ Number of days

23.

About how many days during the past twelve months have you been sick in bed all
or most of the day?
_________ Number of days

24.

Are you currently taking any prescription drugs?

Yes

No

If yes, please list what prescriptions and why you are taking them.

25. Are you currently taking any over the counter drugs?

Yes

No

If yes, please list what and why you are taking them.

26. Do you smoke cigarettes or cigars? (circle one)

Yes

No

The Framing of

27. Personal experience with breast cancer
Have you ever been
diagnosed with breast
cancer? (circle one)

Yes

No

If yes, what month and year
were you diagnosed?
Month_____________ Year_____________
What treatment did you
receive? (circle all that
apply)
Is the cancer cured or in
remission? (circle one)

Radiation

Surgery

Yes

No

Other
Chemotherapy (specify)___________
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28. Personal experience with cancer
Have you ever been
diagnosed with another
type of cancer? (circle one)

Yes

No

If yes, what type of cancer? __________________
What month and year were
you diagnosed?
What treatment did you
receive? (circle all that
apply)
Is the cancer cured or in
remission? (circle one)

Month_____________ Year_____________

Radiation

Surgery

Yes

No

Chemotherapy Other
(specify)___________
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29. Family member/friend experience with breast cancer
Do you any close friends or
family members who have
been diagnosed with breast
cancer? (circle one)
Yes
What is your relationship
with that person?
How close do you feel to
that person?
When was this person
diagnosed with breast
cancer? (circle one)

No

Example:__friend_ ________________

1
Not Very Close

2
Somewhat Close

3
Close

4
Very Close

Earlier than 1970

1970-1980

1980-1990

1990-2000

3
Involved

4
Very
Involved

How involved were you in
this person’s medical care?

1
2
Not Very Involved Somewhat Involved

Is the cancer cured or in
remission? (circle one)

Yes

No

2000-Present
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